By Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Sinnott-Armstrong right here offers an intensive survey of the tricky topic of ethical ideals. He covers theories that grapple with questions of morality equivalent to naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism. He then defends his personal conception that he calls "moderate ethical skepticism," that is that ethical ideals may be justified, yet now not super justified.
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Additional info for Moral Skepticisms
Minimal expressivists cannot take this position, because they admit minimal moral truth. A mental state can then aim at such a minimal moral truth and thereby meet the conditions necessary to count as a belief. 13. Gibbard 1990, 112, denies moral facts on a more substantive notion of fact, but he grants my point here in Gibbard 2003, 18. 28 Issues Moral assertions come next. An utterance of a sentence by an actor on a stage is sometimes said not to be an assertion because the actor does not believe or claim that it is true.
So error theorists cannot avoid negative and conditional moral facts and truths. Some error theorists try to avoid this problem by holding that moral sentences and beliefs presuppose (and do not claim) moral facts. The relevant notion of presupposition comes from Strawson (1950), who claimed that the statement ‘‘The present King of France is bald’’ is neither true nor false, because no present King of France exists. The presuppositions of a sentence are supposed be shared by the negation of that sentence, so ‘‘The present King of France is not bald’’ is also neither true nor false.
Or sixth? It is hard to see why we should stop at any particular level. But if we do not stop, we never get a complete analysis of objectivity. 16 Consequently, Gibbard cannot adequately capture this aspect of common thought and talk within his expressivist framework. For these reasons, I believe that minimal expressivists fail to capture the kinds of objectivity and mind-independence that are implicit in much common moral thought and talk. But that conclusion is not essential to my argument here.